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Introduction of co-payments in CEE
While in Western-European countries co-payments 
for using health care services are widely spread, this is 
a relatively new issue for most of the Central-Eastern Eu-
ropean (CEE) countries. Their story goes back to political 
changes – the collapse of the communist regimes in the 
early 90s. Before, during the communist era all kinds of 
services were covered by the states, and patients could 
use services free of charge. 
Slowly more and more countries were pressed to in-
troduce co-payments for using health care services (in 
addition to co-payments for pharmaceuticals and dental 
care) to cover public deficits and control health-care 
spending. However the introduction of co-payments in 
these countries often met with a cold reception and politi-
cal resistance by the population [1].
First the Baltic countries (in the early 1990s) then 
Bulgaria (in 2000) introduced user fees for health care 
services shortly after the change of the regime. In these 
countries the system of co-payments for health care serv-
ices has been working for more than ten years now [2, 3]. 
In 2003 Slovakia introduced co-payments for health 
care services, however fees were abolished by the new 
government which came into power in 2006 [4].
Hungary had the same experience as Slovakia a few 
years later: co-payments were introduced in 2007 and 
abolished one year later in 2008 as a result of a popula-
tion referendum. 
Czech Republic introduced co-payments in January, 
2008 with the intention to reduce excessive utilisation of 
services and generate additional revenue for the health 
care system. However, the decrease of the measure of the 
fees and the expansion of exemption categories are still 
a regular object of policy discussion [5].
The introduction of co-payments is also proposed to 
take place in January 2011 in Romania.
In countries where user fees have not been introduced 
yet, like in Poland and Ukraine the issue is continuously 
on the carpet, and there is an active policy discussion 
about it. 
In this paper we present the case of the introduction 
(and abolishment) of co-payments in Hungary to serve as 
a lesson for other CEE countries. First, we introduce the 
Hungarian health care system, then the introduction of 
co-payments for health care services in Hungary (goals, 
design, effects). Finally we give some policy recommen-
dations how to establish sustainable patient payments 
policies.
The case of official patient payments in Hungary
Background
Hungarian health care system
Hungary has an insurance-based public health care 
sector funded by income-related social health insurance 
contributions paid for by employees and their employ-
ers. Self-employed individuals pay the full contribu-
tions. The health care providers are financed by the only 
health insurance fund, the National Health Insurance 
Fund Administration (NHIFA).
General practitioners work as private entrepreneurs 
and partially play the role of gate-keepers to specialised 
care: their referral is needed to visit a specialist except for 
some services (e.g. gynaecology, urology, ophthalmol-
ogy, dermatology and otolaryngology) and for hospital 
admission. Their services are reimbursed on a capitation 
base combined with fee-for-service reimbursement. Med-
ical specialists work either in private practices or in hos-
pital units. They are paid via fix on salaries when provid-
ing out-patient services. A fee-for-service point system 
works as a basis for financing the out-patient specialist 
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care. Hospital in-patient care is provided mainly by state 
hospitals although private clinics also exist. The hospital 
funding is based on diagnose-related groups reflecting 
the type and quantity of hospital care provided. In 2007, 
the number of outpatient care institutes was 426. Cur-
rently, there are 77 territorial hospitals which offer basic 
hospital care and 37 “high priority” hospitals (university 
clinics and national medical institutes), which represent 
the highest level of health care services (tertiary care). 
In Hungary, the public expenditure on health is slight-
ly lower than the European average, but higher than many 
Eastern European countries. The total health expenditure 
accounted for 7.4% of GDP in 2007. The OECD Health 
Data 2010 suggest public expenditure on health of about 
1359 $ (PPP) per capita, which represents about 70.40% 
of the total health expenditure.
Changes in 2007
The Hungarian government started on the reform of 
healthcare in 2006. The reform measures had fiscal rea-
sons arising from the Convergence Programme1 to de-
crease the deficit of the government budget and to meet 
the European Union criteria for countries in transition to 
join the Euro zone (known as “Maastricht Criteria”) [6–8].
The continuous deficit of the NHIFA was one of the 
reasons for the Hungarian government to consider health 
care reforms as a part of the Convergence Program of 
Hungary. NHIFA’s deficit varied between 3.4% of the 
total revenue of the Fund in 1994 and 31.2% in 2005 [9]. 
The health care reforms in 2006–2007 aimed to secure 
the revenue of the NHIFA and decrease the expenditure 
on curative health care and pharmaceuticals. 
According to the Convergence Program of Hungary 
the reduction of expenditures on curative-preventive care 
as a percentage of GDP as well as a significant reduc-
tion of the growth rate of pharmaceutical subsidies was 
required in order to improve the government balance. 
Nevertheless, the more efficient use of funds based on 
requirements of cost efficiency and long term financial 
sustainability was necessary, and incentives had to be 
created for providers and households to become more 
cost sensitive [7]. 
As a result of the reform arrangements from 2006 to 
2007 the total health care expenditure as a percentage 
of GDP decreased from 8.1% to 7.4%. Also the share of 
public expenditure of total health care expenditure de-
creased from 72.6% to 70.4% [1] (see Figure 1).
The most important reform measures included the fol-
lowings [11]:
• Structural changes in inpatient care.
 The structural change in inpatient care was the es-
tablishment of a system of high priority and territo-
rial hospitals on the one hand. Currently there are 77 
territorial hospitals, which carry out basic care, and 
37 high priority hospitals – university clinics and na-
tional medical institutes, which represent the highest 
level of health care services.
1 In line with the requirement of EU membership, Members States submit stability programmes, and Member States, which have not yet adopted the 
euro submit convergence programmes to the Commission and the Council each year. The Hungarian Government, on the invitation of the Council, 
prepared an adjusted convergence programme update, out of the regular timetable, in September 2006.
Figure 1. Expenditure on health, Hungary. 
Source: OECD Health Data, 2010.
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 On the other hand, the number of acute hospital beds 
was decreased, while the number of beds for chronic 
inpatient care was increased. Acute bed capacity was 
cut by 16 000 beds (~ 27%), while chronic bed capac-
ity increased by 7500 (~31%) [12].
• The checking of citizens’ eligibility for insurance 
coverage (eligibility is conditioned on legal status).
• Act on the secure and efficient supply of pharmaceu-
ticals and medical aids and on the general rules of 
pharmaceutical trade adopted by Parliament in No-
vember 2006.
• The introduction of co-payments (visit fee for pri-
mary care, outpatient specialist care and in inpatient 
institutes for each day of care).
• The establishment of Health Insurance Supervisory 
Authority.
Also, the transformation of the health insurance sys-
tem was the focus of reform arrangements during 2006–
2007, however the idea of replacing the single-payer 
insurance model by several Health Insurance Manage-
ment Funds have never materialised in practice, the Act 
on Health Insurance Management Funds, was revoked by 
Parliament in May, 2008.
The introduction of co-payments
The introduction of co-payments for using health care 
services was also the part of reform arrangements during 
the period of 2006–2007. However, co-payments were 
abolished one year after their introduction as a result of 
a population referendum initiated by the opposition. In 
the following section we will present the goals of the 
introduction, the design of co-payments and the experi-
ences of the one-year period.
Goals of the introduction of co-payments for health care services
The idea of the introduction of co-payments for health 
care services was first communicated toward the public 
in 2006 when the government published a paper, called 
“The Green Book of the Hungarian Health Care” [13], to 
summarise their proposed arrangements in the health care 
system during the period of 2006–2007, like the transfor-
mation of the insurance system, the structural reform of 
inpatient care, changes in the system of pharmaceutical 
subsidies and the establishment of the Health Insurance 
Supervisory Authority. 
According to the published paper, the main goals of 
the introduction of patient payment were:
a)  to formalise informal patient payments;
b)  to decrease the unnecessary use of health care services.
As for the first aim – formalising informal payments, 
the policy paper argued that “Co-payment exists in 
Hungary, but in an illegal form: in the form of informal 
payments, which is the most unfair way of financing the 
health-care system. Informal payments cause the highest 
burden for the most vulnerable population groups, and 
inhibit them from using health care services. Our main 
goal is to replace the amount of informal patient pay-
ments with a smaller amount of legal co-payments” [13].
As for the second goal – the decrease of unnecessary 
utilisation of health care services – the Green Book re-
ferred to the high number of patient-physician visits in 
Hungary comparing to other European countries: “In 
Hungary the number of visits is two times higher than the 
Western-European average. In some cases these visits are 
not really reasonable” [13].
Besides these two communicated goals, the Conver-
gence Program of Hungary declared that co-payments are 
expected to serve as an instrument to regulate demand, 
increase cost-consciousness of patients, and improve 
most efficient use of public resources. The document also 
mentioned that co-payments would provide additional fi-
nancial resource for health care system at the same time. 
30–40 Mrd HUF (111–148 million euro)2 was expected 
from the introduction for the first year, which accounts 
approximately for 5% of the budget of curative preven-
tive care. Cost-saving was also expected in health care 
expenditure due to the expected decrease of the number 
of visits and prescriptions [7].
Main arguments against the introduction of visit fee
After the publication of the Green Book in July, 2006, 
political discussions started on the proposed arrange-
ments, and some papers commenting on the proposed 
arrangements were published [14, 15] Also, political 
discussion continued after the introduction of the visit 
fee. Those who were against the implementation of co-
payments argued that the introduction was an unfounded 
decision and questioned whether the goals of the intro-
duction of co-payments were relevant in Hungarian con-
text, or doubted that this arrangement was the best way to 
reach the goals mentioned above.
The main arguments against co-payments were the 
following:
• The health state of the Hungarian population is below 
the European average, and in some aspect also behind 
other CEE countries.
• In Hungary the problem with utilisation of health care 
services is quite the opposite: most of the population 
goes to see the doctor at the very last moment. 
• Most of the cases providers induce the utilisation of 
health care services (e.g. controls, prescriptions, tests).
• Those with lower income are more price-sensitive 
than those with higher income, so those who cannot 
afford to pay co-payments will be crowded out of us-
ing health care services.
• The collection of the fees will generate more cost than 
the benefit, so in this way, co-payments cannot pro-
vide additional resource for health care system.
• The collection process would extend the waiting time 
of patients and cause more administrative burden for 
physicians.
• Small amount of co-payments have no potential to 
deal with informal payments: co-payments cannot 
2 Exchange rate: 270 HUF = 1 EUR.
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substitute informal payments, as they are not capable 
to compensate personal attention of the physician. In 
this way the introduction of co-payments would in-
duce a double financial burden for the population.
• Out-of-pocket health care expenditures already have 
a high share in total health care expenditure.
The facts
Informal payments
We have evidence about the existence of informal 
payments in Hungary. According to previous research in 
2003 every four patient paid informally for health care 
services on average 48 euros per year. Informal payments 
are the most widespread at hospital care, where half of 
the patients pay informally, while in GP and out-patient 
care every 6th or 7th patient paid informally [16].
After the collapse of the communist regime, in the 
last 20 years, several Ministry Committees were set to 
estimate the magnitude of informal payments in Hungary 
and make proposals for the solution of the problem. Their 
proposals focused on ethical issues and the transferabil-
ity of informal payments to taxed legal income. However 
none of the endeavouring could reach appreciable results, 
not even the increase of salaries of health care workers in 
2002 [16].
Service utilisation and health status
As for the high number of physician-patient contacts, 
according to OECD data the number of physician contact 
was really one of the highest among OECD countries, on 
average 12.9 per capita in 2006. In the Czech Republic 
and in Slovakia the situation is quite similar with 13 and 
11.3 visits per capita [10] (see Figure 2).
Figure 2. Doctor consultations per capita, 2006.
Source: OECD Health Database.
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However at the same time life expectancy of the 
Hungarian population is more than 5 years below the 
OECD average. In 2007 it was 73.3 years comparing to 
the OECD average, 79 years [10] (see Figure 3) Hungary 
also leads in mortality statistics caused by cancer and car-
diovascular diseases.
Out of pocket payments of Hungarian population
Private expenditure on health care accounted for 
27–30% of the total health care expenditure during the 
period 2006–2008 according to OECD Health Data. Out-
of pocket payments (including official fees in a form of 
co-payments, and also informal payments) covered ap-
proximately 23–24% of the total health care expenditure 
during the period 2006–2008 (see Figure 4). The share 
Figure 3. Average life expectancy in OECD countries 2007.
Source: Health Database 2010.
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of out-of-pocket payments increased continuously after 
the change of the regime, from 11% in the 1990s [10]. 
This trend and these numbers are comparable to other 
CEE countries, however the share of out-of-pocket pay-
ments are relatively high compared to Western European 
countries. 
The introduction of visit fee
The co-payments for health care services called “visit 
fee” were introduced in February, 2007 in GP care, out-
patient care, inpatient care and dental care.
• Amount
 The amount of patient payment was 300 HUF (1.1 
euro) for each visit in GP care and out-patient-care 
if the patient had a referral from GP. In inpatient care 
the same amount of 300 HUF was introduce per day 
Figure 4. Out-of-pocket payments of OECD countries 2008.
Source: Health Database, 2010.
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in hospitals. A higher fee of 600 HUF (2.2 euro) was 
applied in case of choosing a GP where the patient is 
not registered or choosing GP services which is not in 
the patient’s residence, or using out-patient care with-
out a referral (after a half year it increased to 1000 
HUF). 1000 HUF (3.7 euro) which should have been 
paid in case of unnecessary use of urgency care.
• Limits and exemptions
 Children under the age of 18 were exempted. Also, 
users of certain health care services (e.g. emergency 
care, some chronic care/treatments, prenatal and 
preventive care) were exempted as well. A limit was 
introduced for the total amount of payments and de-
fined in maximum 6000 HUF (22.2 euro) per year 
per service type. Limits were applied separately for 
GP, out-patient and inpatient care, the total amount 
of payment was limited at 15 thousands HUF (55.5 
euro) per year. Patients had the right to ask for the 
reimbursement of payments after 20 visits or 20 days 
spent in hospital per year. 
• Beneficiary
 The beneficiary of the collected revenue was the pro-
vider institution (in case of primary care it means GP 
practices).
Abolishment
After 1 year, in April 2008 co-payments were abol-
ished as the result of a referendum initiated by the op-
position. In case of GP and outpatient care 82.4%, in 
case of hospital care 84.1% voted for the abolishment 
of co-payments. The referendum also concerned ques-
tions about other reform arrangements planned by the 
government, like the transformation of the single payer 
insurance model and the introduction of tuition at tertiary 
education. The results in these questions were similar.
(In 2010 a new government came to power, which is 
formed by the former opposition party, who initiated the 
referendum about co-payments. So far, this issue is no 
longer on the carpet.)
The effects of the introduction of co-payments
Decreasing utilisation
The introduction of co-payments in GP, out-patient 
and inpatient care resulted in a significant decrease of 
visits and inpatient care admissions.
• GP visits
 During the 6 month period before the introduction of 
co-payments fee the average monthly number of vis-
its to general practitioners was 5,615,723, during the 
6 months period after the introduction of co-payments 
it decreased to 4,150,282, which represent a 26.1% 
decrease in the number of visits to general practition-
ers [17]. At the same time the decrease in case of chil-
dren practices was not significant, as children under 
the age of 18 were exempted [18].
3 Exchange rate: 270 HUF = 1 EUR. 
4 More information can be found on the homepage of the Ministry of Health: http://www.eum.hu/archivum/finanszirozasi/vizitdij-napidij-elso
• Out-patient visits
 During the 10 month period before the introduc-
tion of co-payments the average monthly number of 
outpatient visits was 5,846,279, while during the 10 
month period after the introduction of co-payments 
it decreased to 4,720,650. This represents a 19.3% 
decrease in the number of outpatient visits [19].
• Inpatient care
 During the 10 month period before the introduction of 
co-payments the average monthly number of admis-
sions was 207,728, while during the 10 month period 
after the introduction of co-payments it decreased 
to 176,444. This represents a 15.1% decrease in the 
number of acute care admissions [20].
Due to the decrease of number of visits, at the same 
time the number of prescriptions and referrals decreased 
as well.
However, other elements of the health care reforms 
which were introduced at the same time could have also 
influenced the number of admissions. GPs were allowed 
to prescript medicament for a longer period of 3 months 
instead of the previously applied practice of 1 month. 
Also in in-patient care due to the structural reform the 
number of acute beds decreased by approximately 27% 
as mentioned above.
The equity effect of the introduction of co-payments 
has not been revealed yet. We do not have information 
whether visits and admissions, which failed to be realised 
were really unnecessary or not.
Only some results of a survey by Gfk Hungária were 
published. According to the results of, to their question 
“Have you delayed your visit to the doctor because you 
were to pay co-payments?” 21% of the respondents liv-
ing with monthly net income under 90 thousands HUF 
(333 euro)3 answered yes, while this ratio was 9% consid-
ering respondents with higher than 150 thousands HUF 
monthly net income (556 euro) [21]. On the other hand 
Mihályi, 2008 argue that the decrease of the number of 
GP visits did not significantly differ in different regions 
the country, and was not correlated with the poverty of 
the territory [18].
After the abolishment of co-payments we can see 
a slight increase in utilisation data, however utilisation 
has not reached the previous level. During the 7 month 
period after the withdrawal of co-payments the average 
monthly number of outpatient visits increased by 3.7% 
comparing to the 7 month period before. Also during the 
7 month period after the withdrawal of co-payments the 
average monthly number of in-patient hospital admis-
sions increased by 3.1% comparing to 7 months period 
before [8, 22]. 
Revenue and savings
The Ministry of Health published a handout on the 
effects and results of the introduction of patient payment 
[23]. The amount of the revenue was estimated4 for 22 
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billion HUF (81.5 million euro) in 2007, 45% went to 
GPs, 29% to out-patient care institutions and 14% for 
hospitals, and the remaining 12% for urgency care, diag-
nostic, dental care (see Table I). Co-payments generated 
significant resources to GPs: 180 thousands HUF (~666.6 
EUR) per GP praxis per month, which is a 25% increase 
of their budget. This can explain their protest against the 
abolishment of visit fee (later they were compensated).
Less attention was paid to in-patient and out-patient 
institutes. They were less lucky, as the collected revenue 
from co-payments were not as significant compared to 
their budget, moreover the decrease in utilisation also af-
fected their budget as fee-for-service point system works 
as a basis for financing the out-patient specialist care and 
hospitals’ fund are based on DRGs (NHIFA data shows 
that quotas were increased after the introduction of co-
payments).
Ministry of Health estimated the amount of indirect 
cost-savings for 25.3 billion HUF (93.7 million euro) 
in curative preventive health care expenditure based on 
the decrease of the use of services, and 15 billion HUF 
(55.6 million euro) in pharmaceutical subsidies due to the 
decrease of the number of prescriptions. Together with 
savings on subsidies for medical aids and sick-allowance 
the estimated amount of total cost saving was 42.4 billion 
HUF (157 Million EUR) [23] (see Table II).
Effect on informal payments
Two studies based on household surveys reported 
results on the effect of the visit fee on informal pay-
ments [16, 24]. The study of TÁRKI [16] indicated that 
fewer patients paid informally for hospital doctors in 
2007 compared to 2003, while no change was observed 
in out-patient specialist care. The study of MEDIÁN 
[24] examined the amount of total informal payments of 
households compared to the total household expenditures 
on the visit fee. They found out that one year after the 
implementation of the visit fee, the total amount of in-
formal payments by households decreased, though this 
decrease was not enough to compensate the household 
expenditures on formal patient payments on an aggregate 
level. Consequently, the total combined expenditure of 
households on formal and informal payments increased. 
However, it is also required to consider that decrease in 
health care utilisation could also cause the decrease in the 
total expenditure on informal payments. 
Population attitude
Not surprisingly co-payments were not so popular 
among health care consumers. However according to pre-
vious results of project ASSPRO CEE 2007 [25], there 
were supporters of the system, who think that co-pay-
ments promote a healthier and more “health-conscious” 
life-style and cost-conscious behaviour which might lead 
to more efficient use of health care services. However, 
even “supporters” of co-payments recall negative experi-
ences with the implementation of co-payments, mostly 
Collected co-payments 
2007.02.15. – 2007.10.31
Million 
HUF
Million 
euro
GP care 6,871.4 25.4
Out-patient care 4,449.7 16.5 
Inpatient care (acute) 1,428.9 5.3 
Dental care 881.3 3.3 
Laboratory 724.8 2.7 
Inpatient care (chronic) 454.1 1.7 
Other 431.2 1.6 
Total 15,241.4 56.4
Table I. Revenue from co-payments 2007.02.15.–2007.10.31. 
Source: Ministry of Health, 2008 [23] (exchange rate 270 HUF 
= 1 euro).
Estimated cost-saving per year Billion HUF
Million 
euro
Currative and preventive care 25.3 93.7
out-patient care 3 11.1
in-patient care (acute) 21.2 78.5
in-patient care (chronic) 1.1 4.1
Pharmaceutical subsidies 15 55.6
Medical aids and medical baths 1 3.7
Financial subsidies (e.g. sick-allowance) 1.1 4.1
Total 42.4 157.1
Table II. Estimated cost savings from co-payments for one year.
Source: Ministry of Health, 2008 [23] (exchange rate 270 HUF 
= 1 euro).
concerning the complex collection process and the nega-
tive attitude of health care providers. 
On the other hand, most health care consumers did 
not believe in the policy goals that were assigned to 
co-payments. In particular, consumers doubted that the 
decrease of utilisation is necessary and did not consider 
co-payments as a useful instrument to replace informal 
payments. They rather felt that the situation of the Hun-
garian health care system was getting worse and insup-
portable, which forced the government to find more 
resources to avoid the collapse of the system. They con-
sidered co-payments as a life-belt, which could have pro-
vided some additional resource for the system to main-
tain or improve the quality of services.
The opinion of health care providers on co-payments 
was quite divided. GPs were the most supportive group 
of these fees, and considered them as an effective instru-
ment in generating additional resource for their practice, 
as well as in reducing unnecessary use of health care 
services. On the other hand medical specialists and physi-
cians working in hospitals complained about having only 
tom VIII, nr 1/2010 45
współpłacenie
additional work and high administrative burden of the 
collection of co-payments.
However, both providers and consumers agreed that 
the issue of visit fee became a political issue, which di-
vided political parties and followers. Moreover they felt 
that the discussion of policy goals of the introduction of 
co-payments was missing.
What we do not know...
• Some data on the decrease of utilisation are avail-
able concerning the number of visits but we cannot 
really distinguish the effect of co-payments from the 
effect of other arrangements during the same period 
(e.g structural reforms in inpatient care, changes in 
prescription practice).
• The equity effects of the introduction of co-payments 
has not been revealed yet. We do not know which so-
cial groups were mainly affected by the fees.
• We do not know whether the attitude of the popula-
tion toward informal patient payments has changed 
due to the introduction of co-payments.
• We know little about the incentives of health care pro-
viders generated by the introduction of-payments.
• We have no information about the costs of the intro-
duction of co-payments or the cost of the administra-
tion/collection process.
• We have no information about the utilisation of the 
collected revenue. We do not know how co-payments 
affected quality of services or health outcomes.
Experiences from other countries
Other CEE countries, namely Slovak and Czech Re-
public had similar experiences with visit fee concerning 
the design, the effects and population attitude towards 
co-payments. In all of these countries the issue of co-
payments has had an important role in policy discussions 
and politics, which divide political parties.
Slovakia introduced co-payments for health care 
services in June, 2003. The fee was 20 SKK per physi-
cian visit, 50 SKK per day of hospitalisation, 60 SKK per 
ambulatory visits. Patients with chronic illnesses and vul-
nerable groups were exempted. According to estimations 
in the second half of 2003, following the introduction of 
cost-sharing, there was a 10% reduction in the number 
of outpatient visits compared to the same period in 2002, 
also the number of emergency visits dropped by 13%. 
However, in specialised outpatient-care and hospitals the 
decline was lower (2%, respectively). After a few years, 
a new government came into power in 2006 and abol-
ished co-payments [4, 26].
In Czech Republic the system of co-payments for 
health care services had been introduced at the beginning 
of 2008 and was intended to reduce excessive utilisation 
of services and generate additional revenue for the health 
care system. The fee was 30 CZK per physician visit, 60 
CZK per day of hospitalisation, 90 CZK per ambulatory 
visits. Children under the age of 6, patients with chronic 
illnesses and imperilled pregnant women were exempted. 
During its first year of implementation, the number of 
emergency visits dropped by 36%, ambulatory specialist 
visits by 15% and ambulatory specialist visits in inpatient 
facilities by 19%. In addition, the number of prescrip-
tions fell by 28%. During the first year five billion Czech 
Crowns were collected from co-payments and the cost-
savings due to this decrease were estimated to another 
five billion Czech Crowns in the system. 
So far, due to the pressure of the new opposition 
(who called for the complete abolition of all co-pay-
ments in their campaign at the regional elections in 
2008) the decrease of the measure and the expansion of 
exemption categories are still a regular object of policy 
discussion. In February, 2009 government exempted 
children under 18 from co-payments. For people over 
the age of sixty-five the maximum limit for user fees 
and co-payments were reduced from 5000 to 2,500 
Crowns [5, 26–28]. 
Conclusion – lessons for other CEE countries 
and policy makers
We saw that the three CEE countries (Czech Repub-
lic, Hungary and Slovakia) had the same experiences 
with the introduction of co-payments. These fees were 
met with a cold reception by the population and also 
political resistance, which divided political parties and 
followers. Though, introduction of co-payments/increase 
of taxes will never be popular among the population, we 
have some recommendations based on Hungarian experi-
ences to help develop sustainable patient payment policy. 
Hungarian experiences might serve as an instructive case 
study for other CEE countries as well.
Based on Hungarian experiences, the following steps 
are inevitable when developing a sustainable patient pay-
ment policy:
1.  Preliminary research:
• More studies would be required on policy goals (to 
reduce excessive utilisation, generate additional rev-
enue, dealing with informal payments), whether they 
are relevant in country specific system. 
–  Identification of the current situation.
–  Identification of the objectives and desired sce-
narios.
–  Identification of all possible alternative solutions 
in accordance with the policy goals and their an-
ticipatory effects.
• Research is necessary on the anticipatory effects of 
the chosen solution (effect on financing, utilisation, 
equity, quality, administration, attitudes from every 
stakeholder’s perspectives).
• Mapping of the incentives generated by the new fees 
and the interests of stake-holders (health care con-
sumers, providers and policy makers) is necessary.
• Identification of assessment criteria (and quality indi-
cators) of the proposed system is necessary, to be able 
to monitor the processes and effects.
• Not to forget that practices of other countries should 
not be copied, and must be adapted to country spe-
cific context.
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2.  Decision making:
• Political consensus is required between political par-
ties, to be able to get the arrangements across popula-
tion’s resistance.
• Health care consumers and providers should be in-
volved in the decision-making process. Social con-
sensus on this issue is necessary before introducing 
formal patient payments.
3.  Public discussion:
• More policy and public discussion about policy goals 
is necessary.
• Close communication with the public and health care 
providers is needed to clarify the objectives and con-
tent of a future patient payment model.
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Abstract:
The introduction of co-payments for using health care services is 
a relatively new issue for most of the Central-Eastern European (CEE) 
countries. Some CEE countries, like Slovakia, Hungary and Czech Re-
public have similar experiences with the introduction of such co-pay-
ments. These fees were met with a cold reception by the population and 
also political resistance, which led to the abolishment of these pay-
ments in Slovakia as well as in Hungary. 
Our paper focuses on the experiences of Hungary, where co-payments 
for health care services were introduced in February, 2007 and abol-
ished one year later as a result of a population referendum. Hungarian 
experiences can serve as a lesson for policy makers from other CEE 
countries to develop sustainable patient payment policies.
Streszczenie:
Krótka historia współpłacenia za świadczenia opieki 
zdrowotnej na Węgrzech – lekcje dla krajów sąsiednich
Słowa kluczowe: współpłacenie, opłaty za korzystanie, Węgry, 
Europa Środkowo-Wschodnia, polityka dopłat pacjentów
Wprowadzenie współpłacenia pacjentów za świadczenia opieki zdro-
wotnej jest stosunkowo nowym działaniem w większości krajów Europy 
Środkowo-Wschodniej. Niektóre z tych krajów, jak Słowacja, Węgry czy 
Czechy, mają podobne doświadczenia z implementacją dopłat. Opłaty 
te spotkały się z ograniczoną akceptacją zarówno społeczną, jak i po-
lityczną, co w rezultacie doprowadziło do ich zniesienia na Słowacji, 
a także na Węgrzech.
Artykuł skupia się na doświadczeniach Węgier, gdzie współpłacenie 
za świadczenia opieki zdrowotnej było wprowadzone w lutym 2007 r. 
i zniesione rok później w rezultacie ogólnokrajowego referendum. Do-
świadczenia węgierskie mogą posłużyć jako lekcja dla decydentów 
politycznych z innych krajów Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej pomocna 
w celu rozwoju odpowiedniej polityki dopłat pacjentów. 
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